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Tort law depends on three key concepts: Causation, responsibility, and
fault. However, I argue that the three key concepts are neither necessary, nor
sufficient, for tort.
I. INTRODUCTION
The place to begin is at a distinction in law that seems at first
intuitive, but on closer examination proves very difficult to pin down,
and that is the distinction between public and private law. Lawyers
commonly refer to the distinction, and could divide certain types of
litigation into one or the other category - tax law and welfare law fit
neatly into the public realm, contracts and torts fit instead into private
law. But what exactly is the significance of  the distinction?  I'll develop
some ideas about distributive and corrective justice in order to draw
out this distinction, since the division of  public and private law
depends in some part on the division of  distributive and corrective
justice.
However, these ideas depend largely (as do all good ideas) on
more fundamental metaphysical notions - in this case on the
relationship between causation, fault, and responsibility. And so this
relationship will be the main focus of the remaining sections of the
paper. Fault, responsibility, and causation are inter-related concepts
that are important to private law in a number of  ways that I will
describe. For our purposes, it will be important to take note of  them
for two immediate reasons:
1. Metaphysical problems with an analysis of  causation extend
into practical usage of  the term. Often, in these trouble cases,
strict causation is perniciously left aside, replaced instead by
causal or moral intuitions. This practice is especially dangerous
when undertaken by a judge or jury. This is because it has the
result of  undermining objectivity, and a fortiori hiding the fact
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of  the undermined objectivity behind the veil of  supposed
causation.
2. Responsibility, fault, and causation come apart on some
significant cases. That is, one might overshadow or even trump
another. Since all three are important, it should be clear the
circumstances under which one of  these concepts should be
edged out by another - especially, as we shall see, in tort law.
Tort law is going to be especially important to this discussion,
since my second worry (above) is especially well demonstrated in
private law, where one party must prove injury by another party in
order to win judgment.
Along the way I'll discuss some aspects, analyses, and criticisms
of  metaphysical and scientific accounts of  in the contemporary study
of  causation. We'll be referring to this concept as a technical term in
a very technical way, so it's important to determine what the experts
think about it, in order to increase our ability to determine whether
lawyers are using it correctly.
Finally, I'll conclude by giving some criticisms of  some of  the
views discussed, and summarize my conclusions of  some of  the
foundational work in this field. Let's begin.
II.  PUBLIC V. PRIVATE
Distributive justice is concerned primarily with the distribution
of  certain goods (money, property, awards and punishment) across
a society. Questions of  taxation, for example, are addressed in this
realm. How should the tax burden be distributed? Equally, so that
every individual is required to pay an equal share? Or according to
wealth, so that the rich end up paying a higher share of  the taxes?
Or according to land ownership or use, according to the view that
those who own large lots of  land are getting a relatively higher share
of  protection from the government?
Likewise, we must decide by what rules we will punish those
who commit crimes, as well as determine what crimes we will punish.
The former is probably a harder decision to make. For example,
how do you distribute justice to a person guilty of  a murder?  Taking
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his life might seem like an equitable solution - an eye for an eye. But
should 'equitable' be the deciding factor? And what about a serial
murderer?  You cannot kill him several times. What should we, as a
society, do with rapists?  Or with adulterers?
I don't know the answers to these questions. And for this
discussion, we can set them to the side. The important detail to note
is that distributive justice is concerned overwhelmingly with public
law and public policy. Regarding issues from taxation to murder,
these are issues that we feel are best handled within the realm of, as
well as prosecuted by, the state. Public law, it could be said, is
concerned with what rights we have to be free of  harm in general.
This is not so for corrective justice, however.
Corrective justice instead occupies itself  with putting right some
injury. Contract law and tort law are examples of  issues best addressed
by this form of  justice. Under what conditions are contracts
legitimate?  What penalties should be levied when a contract is broken
by one party? When one party inflicts a certain type of  injury or
harm on another, often he has an additional right, not only to
distributive justice, which punishes those who infringe on the rights
of  others, but he also has an additional right to be compensated for
his losses by whomever injured him.
Likewise, and more importantly for this discussion, tort law
falls within the realm of  corrective justice. When Adam injures Eve,
Eve may find that Adam owes her compensation for the injury he
inflicted. If  that is the case, then Eve has the right to take the case to
a judge to determine what, if  any, penalties Adam must face to correct
the matter. In doing so, the judge takes steps to reset any damage
done by the unwarranted injury, bringing an equilibrium to the
situation between the two parties.
Corrective justice does not concern itself  with the character
of  the individuals. In this case, the judge does not worry whether
Adam is a good Christian and business owner, or whether Eve is a
Communist and a sexual deviant. Rather than judging based on the
character of  the individuals, the judge is concerned only about the
character of  the injury. She must take pains to judge without respect
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to the persons, judging only the deed.
Notice here that injury is neither necessary nor sufficient for a
judgment in tort law. Richard Epstein, in several places,2  has argued
that the role of  strict liability should be expanded in tort cases. Citing
Aristotelian corrective justice, he claims that the victim should be
compensated for any injury brought about by the assailant. But strict
liability is not sufficient for Aristotelian corrective justice. Strict liability
if  the view that all that is needed for liability is injury - injury entails
liability. Corrective justice for Aristotle goes one step further, and
requires that wrongful liability - injury plus fault entails liability - is
necessary for a tort. And importantly, notes Posner3 strict liability
holds no place in tort law. The idea that a party has a duty of
compensation based merely on the fact of  injury belongs to distributive
justice. Distributive justice, remember, is concerned with what rights
a person has to be free of  injury prime facie, rather than how or if
he should be compensated.
So far, we see that injury is not sufficient for liability. According
to Aristotle, and to Posner, we're going to need some additional
criteria. We're going to at least need the normative notion that the
injurer ought not to have caused the injury. Given that, we will have
injury, normativity, and causation, but even that will prove to be not
be quite enough.
Borgo4  agrees with Epstein that strict liability (i.e., injury entails
liability) is all that is required in tort law. He argues, however, that the
notion of  causation which is used to decide liability should be a
special idiosyncratic version of  causation, i.e., one that necessarily
contains the moral weight needed to determine wrongdoing in
addition to fault. Causation, he says, should be thought of  in this
context in terms of  moral responsibility for consequences. The
2 See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 49 Journal of
Legal Studies 8
(1979), and Epstein Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of  Strict Liability, 165 Journal
of  Legal Studies 3 (1974).
3 Posner, R., The Problems of  Jurisprudence, Harvard UP 324 (1990).
4 Borgo, J. (1979), Causal paradigms in tort law, 8 Journal of  Legal Studies 419, 54.
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context of  causation carries with it other implications simply by virtue
of  what we generally consider a cause.5
Again, Posner's answer to this is simple: causation is not
identical with responsibility. Consider the following scenario: a new
hardware store opens across the street from an old hardware store,
generating business taken from the other store's customer base. Any
successful profits of  the new store will inevitably cause injury to the
old store. But, as Posner argues, we would not hold the new store
responsible for the injuries sustained by the old store, even given the
fact that it caused them.6 And so based on the same argument, it
would not be reasonable to hold them liable, either.
This discussion is meant to motivate, in the reader, the intuitions
that simple concepts like causation and responsibility and liability
come apart in the simplest cases, and furthermore that the relationship
between them is by no means clear. I'll now take the time to draw
out just what we, as prudent jurists, mean and ought to mean by
these various concepts.
III. FAULT, CAUSATION, RESPONSIBILITY
Tort law, as a discipline, is a relatively new phenomenon to the
justice system. We find that criminal law, of  course, goes back at
least to biblical stories. In ancient Greece, criminal cases were pressed
by families of  victims, rather than by the state. In one Platonic dialog,
for example, we find Euthyphro about to bring his father to court
for murder. But the concept of  the tort is relatively new, and so the
ideas surrounding it, including the conditions it must meet, are still
freshly evolving.
Also evolving, therefore, are the concepts associated with tort
law. Concepts such as fault, causation, and responsibility are essential
to the tort case, but all are problematic. And not only does each hold
an ambiguous position in law, associated with each term one finds
mounds of  philosophical problems as well. In a discussion of
responsibility, for example, the position that you hold on free will
5 This point will come up again when we talk about Mackie’s “Causal Field” hypothesis.
6 See Note 3 at 324, 25
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obviously will be relevant. It's important, then, that we try specifically
to set out just what we mean by each of  these terms, as well as what
is the relationship between them.
In complicated cases, these three criteria come apart.
Problematically, in those cases, one or another of  them gets forced
out. And so the puzzle is, don't we think that each of  these criteria is
relevant, if  not necessary, to prove liability?  And a further puzzle is:
if  we do, how does one explain cases in which one or another is
absent, but in which we still want to find a defendant liable?  I'll
address the first question first.
A tort is some damage done for which the offender is liable to
the victim in a civil suit. In it's simplest terms, A must pay for damaging
B's property, if  (1) A is at fault, that is, he wrongly did that damage to
B, (2) A is the cause of  the damage, that is, it is actually true that he
did it, and (3) he is responsible, that is, he committed the act willfully.
In the simplest torts we will find all of  these conditions satisfied. If,
for example, Adam used a key to scratch the paint on Eve's car,
Adam should have to pay a penalty to Eve, as well as cover the costs
of  the repairs. But not only are these conditions not necessary, they
are not even sufficient. Counterexamples from cases, as well as
intuition, show that it is less than clear what role these conditions
play in tort. But first, let's look at the intuition that they are jointly
necessary and sufficient.
IV. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
Take the case of  Adam scratching Eve's car again. If  Adam
scratched the car accidentally, without knowledge, and while taking
due care, then we could argue that he did not do so willfully. In this
case damage to the car should be covered by Eve's insurance company,
since it was an "accident." Adam's good nature might motivate him
to help cover the cost once he learned about the causal nature of  the
act. But a judge would find that the insurance company is responsible
for the damages, not Adam.
On the other hand, if  he did act willfully, we may be more
inclined to attribute responsibility to Adam. Given this, and given
that the other two conditions, fault and causation, are satisfied, then
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we would hold Adam liable. Assuming the presence of  the other
two conditions, then, it looks like intuition finds that responsibility is
both necessary and sufficient.
Let's now look at the case of  fault. Did Adam wrongly scratch
Eve's car?  Or wasn't his action wrong?  Did the scratch occur while
he was helping Eve remove a bumper sticker supporting a presidential
candidate who did not win the most recent election?  Did he scratch
the car while trying to crush a bee who had landed on her trunk,
knowing as he did that Eve is deathly allergic to the sting of  a bee?
In these cases, our intuitions would be unlikely to tell us that Adam
is liable for the damage that he caused, being as it is that acted as he
did with the best intentions.
Assume, instead, that Adam did bring about the scratch
wrongly, which is to say that he is at fault. In that case, we would also
hold him liable, regardless of  whether his action was malicious or
otherwise. And so just as long as the other two conditions are also
satisfied, it seems that fault is both necessary and sufficient for liability
in this case.
Of  course, if  Adam's action caused the scratch, and the other
two conditions are satisfied, then we'd find him liable. In fact, given
the other two conditions, the case turns on the question of  causation.
If  it can be shown that there is a causal link between his action and
the scratch, then he's guilty. Likewise, if  there's no causal connection
(i.e., the key never physically touched the car) then he's not guilty. In
this case, given the other two criteria, causation is both necessary
and sufficient.
In simple cases, then, intuition tells us that, in tort law, fault,
causation, and responsibility are jointly necessary and sufficient for
liability. This means that, given all three, we have liability, but take
any of  the three away in this case, and we do not. What's more, the
system of  laws is set up so that, in making a determination of  liability,
the judge or jury seeks to satisfy all three of  these conditions. So we
have not only intuition on our side, but also the underlying system
that supports tort law.
But are things really so simple as I've cast them?  Of  course
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not - they never are. In the above case, it was intuition that guided
the thought that all of  four concepts were present. We had fault,
causation, responsibility, and liability. That's right, the outcome of
the above case seemed so simple because liability came in with the
intuition. But what about cases where intuition also gives us liability,
but where one or another of  the other three conditions comes apart?
Where would that leave our case in terms of  necessary and sufficient
conditions?  Would we still find that all three conditions were both
jointly necessary and sufficient for liability?  We'll first take a look at
the contemporary analysis of  causation, which will help us better to
answer the above questions.
V. CAUSAL CHAINS
Before I go on to talk about causation in the law, I should
spend some time developing one analysis of  causation, i.e., the
counterfactual account. The most well received theory currently
regarding causation stems from David Lewis' work giving a
counterfactual account of  causation. Lewis argued extensively that c
causes e if  there is a relation of  causal dependence running from C to E
(According to Lewis's definition, C stands for 'cause', and E for
'effect', though they're just variables). And causal dependence is stated
counterfactually:
E causally depends on C, if  in a world where c would have
been the case, then e would have been the case, and if  c would not
have been the case, then e would not have been the case.
So in some possible world where c occurs, in that same possible
world we find that e occurs. Lewis then goes on to define causation
not in terms of  causal dependence, but in terms of  chains of  causal
dependence. He defines a chain of  causal dependence (or a causal
chain) as any relation between C and E where E causally depends on
X, which causally depends on C, where X is some finite number of
causally dependent events.
Lewis invokes the concept of  chains of  causal dependence to
avoid to main problems in the metaphysics of  causation - the
preemption pairing problem, and the problem of  effects. For our
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purposes, however, we can set these important problems aside. The
important lesson to learn here is that causation is between events,
where the relationship between those events is that of  a counterfactual
chain of  causal dependence. The following discussion of  liability in
tort law, as we'll see, will rely heavily on causal chains.
VI. NEITHER NECESSARY, NOR SUFFICIENT
VI.A. FAULT
To start, think about the concept of  fault in this context.
Deodands - inanimate objects which are the subject of  legal cases -
were once thought to be liable in tort cases. If  a wagon wheel rolled
down the hill and crashed into the side of  your building, causing
damage, you had a legitimate complaint against the wheel. In many
cases, if  causation was proved, the wheel would be destroyed
(presumably to prevent any further causation, but possibly "give the
wheel what was coming it is" Distributive, or retributive justice?).
Although we no longer prosecute deodands, the case shows that
intuition about responsibility comes apart from causation in hard
cases. That is to say that intuition gives us liability, but not
responsibility. So we base the liability on the causation, rather than
determining that the wheel was responsible.
In this instance, responsibility is abandoned, and what we are
left with is a distinction between accidental and intentional harm.
Imagine the case of  a driver of  a pick up truck who hits and kills a
kid on a motorcycle on some back road. Did he cause the death of
the kid?  Certainly by any analysis, the causal chain connects the
truck driver to the subsequent death of  the biker. But is he
responsible?  Along the distinction between accidental and intentional
harm we find the distinction between criminal and civil liability.
Certainly by driving an automobile, he has a duty and undertakes a
responsibility to do so with due care. But he owes this responsibility
to the public, to society, and so any penalties that a judge may serve
him will be criminal. If  the accident was unintentional, there is no
civil case. But if  it was intentional, his survivors may sue the driver in
a civil case.
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Elizabeth Smith argues that the legal test for whether an act is
faulty has come to be foreseeability. And fault, as we've seen above, is
of  paramount importance to private law. Oliver Wendell Holmes
remarked, "where there is no fault, there is no liability in tort."
But even where there no obvious fault, but a heavy injury, it
seems unfair for the victim to bear the entire burden of  loss. If  a
train is carrying hundreds of  cases of  industrial fireworks, even if
the greatest care was taken during the storage and packaging of  the
fireworks, the owner of  the train should not bear the burden of  loss
should an accident occur. Even if  every precaution were taken, such
a large loss as the destruction of  a train and cars and rail should not
be carried by the train owner alone.
This is when Smith's notion of  foreseeability becomes
important. If  a reasonable person should have known or been able
to foresee that a problem might occur but does not, then his/her
mental state is said to be faulty. Even if  they act with the best
intentions, and no malice at all, they failed to give proper attention,
and their actions therefore imposed risks onto others. Since a
reasonable person should have been able to foresee a problem, their
acts are considered careless and therefore negligent.
An example is Polemis v. Furness, Witting & Co,7 which
concerned a shipi used to transport chartered cargo to Africa. The
cargo on this voyage was flammable, and when a heavy board fell, it
ignited the substance, burning and destroying the ship. The question
was whether the charterers should have foreseen that the plank would
fall, and if  so, are they negligent for the effect?
The Court ruled that the charterers should have foreseen that
the plank would fall, and should have foreseen that a falling plank
would cause a spark and a fire in a hold full of  flammable material.
Consequently, using the test of  foreseeability, the ship owners were
ruled to be liable, and had to pay damages.
7 Re an Arbitration between Polemis and Furness, Witting & Co. 3 KB 56 [1912]
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VI.B. CAUSATION
We've seen the cases where responsibility, even in the presence
of  the other two conditions, is not necessary for liability. Now we'll
look at cases in which causation is not a requirement. In Summers
v. Tice,8  three friends were out hunting quail. Careless shots were
fired, and the third individual was shot in the face, leaving his vision
impaired. In this case, the judge ruled for the plaintiff, basing his
decision on aggregate causation. He held both of  the hunters liable
equally for the damage to the third's vision, although only one pellet
caused the damage, and so only one hunter was causally efficacious
in the injury. The judge ruled that if  one or the other of  the hunters
could not prove that he was not causally linked to the injury, then
they both must share the liability equally. In this important case, the
roles of  who must prove what were reversed. We generally think
that the victim must prove liability of  the plaintiff. In the case of
aggregate causation, the judge set stronger standards: he required
them to prove that they were not liable. When neither one could, he
levied his penalty on them both.
Aggregate causation is not unique to this case. Market liability
was adopted by courts involved in cases in which the maker of  a
specific product could not be identified, but those firms that are in
the market of  producing those products could be identified. Liability
is thus spread across all of  the relevant firms
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories9  is a case that involves DES,
a substance prescribed by doctors, but later determined to be toxic.
This case is difficult, because there were several manufacturers of
DES. Some larger than others, so that it is difficult to determine
how much of  a share of  the overall amount of  DES was
manufactured by each firm. In many cases, it is also difficult to
determine which manufacturer made the doses which were taken by
certain individuals. Furthermore symptoms don't appear until years
after exposure to toxic chemicals - often showing themselves in the
offspring of those exposed.
8 Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)
9 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980)
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In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the victim could not prove
which of  the many firms manufactured the drug that she took. In
this situation, a large number of  injuries were known to be caused
by the drugs created by these several manufacturers. But neither the
victim could not determine which made the one that injured her.
Nonetheless, the judge ruled that each was sure to have caused some
injuries. Penalties were paid by each defendant according to its own
market share, according to how much it made and sold.
Causation remains intact in this case of  aggregate causation.
Although no direct causal link could be determined, the judge ruled
that each defendant harmed a class of  people, even if  it could not be
determined that it injured any individual person. But remember above,
in Summers v. Tice,10  where causation was not even a requirement
at all. One of the defendants definitely did not satisfy a causal link
between his action and the injury. Still, even in the absence of
causation, he was found to be liable.
This may not seem so problematic, but imagine the case where
there are not two shooters but instead ten. In this case, the only
causal relationship the other nine had to the injured party is that
they happened to be hunting with the individual who was causally
efficacious.11
VI.C. RESPONSIBILITY
This might be one of  the most difficult metaphysical and moral
entities to pin down exactly. Responsibility is associated with problems
of  free will, of  course, and analyzed in terms of  the 'principle of
alternate possibilities,' or more simply, 'could have done otherwise.'
Imagine that Adam was intending to scratch Eve's car tomorrow
with his keys. But Adam's brilliant psychiatrist made it so that if, just
at the last minute, Adam decides not to commit the act, then a device
will cause Adam to commit the act. It's not the case that Adam decides
not to act, but it also is the case that he couldn't have done otherwise.
In this case, we could not legitimately hold Adam morally responsible
10 Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)
11 Simmonds, N., Justice, causation, and private law. In d’Entrèves, M. P. and Vogel, U., editors, Public
and Private: legal, philosophical, and philosophical perspectives, chapter 8, 149, 176 (Rouledge, 2000).
THE ROLE OF CAUSATION IN  DECISION OF TORT LAW
Gnlu Journal of law, Development anD politics  –  Volume 1/Issue 2/December 2009
34
for an act he could not have not committed, but in Court, we'd still
hold him liable, since he acted willfully. The principle of  alternate
possibilities states that an agent is responsible for an act just in case
he could have done otherwise.12
But we needn't look at so fanciful a model to see our intuitions
that responsibility comes apart from liability. On the one hand, we
believe that people should be responsible for the outcomes of  their
actions, but at the same time it would be unreasonable to hold
someone responsible for the outcome of  every causal process that
results from their action (e.g., holding Hitler's mother responsible
for the Holocaust, because she set certain events in motion.)13
Let's look at a case. In Overseas Tankship, Ltd. v. Dock &
Engineering Co., Ltd,14 a cargo ship (Wagon Mound) carelessly
discharged some oil into the bay while at dock. The oil not only
interfered with the operations of  a nearby wharf, but later caused to
wharf  to catch fire, resulting in extensive damage to the wharf.
Discharging oil into the water was not uncommon at that time.
At issue here was foreseeability of  the damage and probability
of  the damage. The Court ruled that although the fire was a probable
consequence of  the action of  the ship, it was not responsible for the
damage since it was not a foreseeable outcome of  the action. That
responsibility comes away from liability is best seen with praise and
blame. That the consequences of  your action was unforeseeable to
you at the time is reason to withhold praise, just as it is with blame,
but not a reason to deny causation.
VII. MACKIE ON CAUSATION
A house catches fire and subsequently burns to the ground.
Investigators come to the scene, and determine that a short circuit
in one outlet was the cause of  the fire. But what exactly do they
mean when they say that it was the cause?  They cannot mean that the
short circuit was the necessary condition of  the fire, since any
12 Frankfurt, H., Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility, 46 Journal of  Philosophy 829, 839
(1969).
13 See Smith, pp. 149-51 for a discussion.
14 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd 1 UKPC 388 AC (1961).
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homeless person walking by might have thrown a cigarette onto the
dry grass, and ignited the house. Likewise, they cannot mean that the
short was a sufficient condition of  the fire, since the short circuit
required the presence of  oxygen in the atmosphere, along with some
oily rags nearby, and a proper degree of  neglect at just the right time
(had the queen of  england flown over at just than moment and doused
it with water, the fire would never have gotten a chance to start). The
short was determined to be the cause, but it was neither necessary
nor sufficient. So what exactly was it?
Mackie argues that the short circuit was an insufficient but
necessary part of  a condition which was itself  unnecessary but
sufficient for the resulting event.15  He calls this the INUS condition.
So what the experts are saying in this case by calling the short circuit
the cause, is that it is a condition of  this sort - an INUS condition. In
fact, when we make statements in which we claim that one event
caused another event, we are often referring to it as satisfying this
sort of  condition.
But I can formalize that a bit more. Let AB-C be a minimally
sufficient condition (A is the short circuit, B is the oily rags, and -C
represents the negative event where the queen neglected to extinguish
the fire from the air). If  we string together all of  the minimally
sufficient condition disjunctively, (AB-C or D-E-F or -GHI or …),
then we have the necessary and sufficient conditions. Each individual
AB-C is a minimally sufficient condition, and each letter (e.g., B) is
an INUS condition.
Whether this is right remains to be seen.16 But it still leaves
open the question, why do the experts determine that the short circuit
was the cause of  the fire, rather than any of  the other INUS
conditions?  Mackie admits that context plays a large role here, and
invokes the notion of  the 'causal field.'
Imagine the case in which Adam contracted the flu at time t.
The question is: what causes influenza?  But this depends on the
15 Mackie, J., Causes and conditions, ed. Sosa, E. and Tooley, M., Causation, Oxford Readings in
Philosophy, chapter 1, 1, 32 (Oxford University Press, 1993).
16 For a reply and objection to the necessary and sufficient condition account of  causation, see
Kim, 1993.
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context of  the question. You might be asking a wide-context question:
what causes influenza in humans?  The answer, then, involves a discussion
of  the way viruses attack cells and reproduce, overcoming the host
body and causing sickness. But your question might be a more narrow-
context one: given the presence of  the influenza virus, what caused this Adam
to contract the illness at t while others who were also exposed to the virus did not?
The answer to this question will instead focus on issues such as
weakened immune system in Adam, the presence of  antibodies in
other folks, and the like.
Mackie calls the context of  the question a 'causal field.' In the
wide-context question, the causal field is the region that surrounds
all people at all times in which they are exposed to this virus. But in
the more narrow-context version of  the question, the causal field
contains only Adam, and the viruses to which he was exposed, and
the time that he was actually sick.
So now we are ready to relate this solution back to our problem
with the short circuit. When the experts make the claim that 'A caused
B', they are really referring to the elliptical proposition that states
that 'A caused B in reference to the field F.' And remember, to say
that A was the cause is merely to claim that it was an INUS condition
of  a condition that was itself  minimally sufficient to bring about the
effect.17
The notion of  causal field is going to be important to the
project at hand in many important ways. First, it is one of  the best
philosophical accounts of  causation in terms of  necessary and
sufficient conditions. Given that all of  the theories we've looked at
so far are trying to piece causation into legal theory in terms of  its
necessary or sufficient conditions, Mackie's arguments help us to
formalize that. Second, in the next section of  this article, Hart and
Honoré will argue that the contextual dependence of  causal
statements does not reduce to arbitrary policy judgments. I'll defend
their position, by invoking Mackie's causal field.18
17 See Note 16 at 39, 41
18 Actually, although Mackie develops the notion fully, the causal field’s first appearance was due
to John Anderson The Problem of  Causality, in Australasian Journal of  Psychology and
Philosophy, 16 (1938).
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IX. FURTHER RESEARCH
Of  course, this entire vein of  research owes its foundation to
the work of  Hart and Honoré in the middle of  the 20th century.
And while my concern about the other conditions is now shown to
be less than concrete, causation still plays a strong role in private law.
Liability is still based to a large degree on causation of  harm. This is
the work that Hart and Honoré were so concerned with, and it is my
second concern of  this article.
As we saw in Mackie, what we consider to be the cause of
some event depends heavily on context. Context dictates which
questions we ask, which will in turn determine the sorts of  answers
that we receive. This is important because, while factual, the answers
give us only some of  the information, leaving much of  it out. What's
left out is often as important to context as what's included. Context
therefore dictates which causal chains we follow. This is important
because there are often many causal links, and in complicated cases
many links will contain many branches, making it impossible to
consider the whole scene. Which causal chains we consider to be
efficacious will dictate what we finally determine the cause to be, but
which causal chain we select is itself  determined by context.
What I've just described is part of  the position called 'causal
minimalism', a view espoused by legal realists. Causal minimalism
tells us that causal language is just a cover for inconsistent enforcement
of  public policy. This sounds like a conspiracy theory but it's not:
this behavior will often go unnoticed even to the judges and juries
who commit it. The problem as they see it is that causal language is
less than definite in most cases, and yet it is the strongest condition
used to determine that outcome of  tort cases.
The legal realists claim is that every event that satisfies the 'but
for' condition counts as a potential cause of  the event. 'The fire
would not have occurred but for the presence of  x', where x includes
oxygen in the atmosphere, the Queen of  England's neglect to fly
over, as well as the dropping of  the match. For the legal realists then,
each of  these events (even the negative events) hold equal claim as a
cause of  the subsequent fire.
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The problem comes about when the judge or jury is called
upon to choose one or another of  these conditions, and assign it the
role of  the cause of  the fire. The legal realists present us with a
dilemma: is that determination factual, or is it representative of  some
policy decision on the part of  the judge or jury?  Their answer is that
it is the latter.19
Hart and Honoré argue that this could not be further from
the truth. To summarize their position, the legal realists are
committing a fallacy when they move from, 'there are no simple
principles guiding the Courts' decisions regarding causation,' to 'there
are no principles at all guiding the Courts' decisions regarding
causation'. That we cannot easily summarize the principles, or provide
a simple analysis of  causation is not evidence that there are no such
principles in play. The legal realist position, according to Hart and
Honoré, are committing something akin to the fallacy of arguing
from ignorance.
Causal determinations are not nearly as arbitrary as proponents
of  this position would have you believe. Hart and Honoré instead
give a simple common-sense argument: they say that in determining
what is the cause of  an event one only has to employ regular common
sense. We first take the elements of  an event that are either common
or static. We may then legitimately remove them as the possible causes.
The presence of  oxygen, and probably the proximity of  oily rags
would be omitted here, since oxygen in the atmosphere is a common
occurrence, and the rags had been sitting static (possibly) long before
the fire started. Even if  is true that they are essential, they will not be
counted among the causes.
The next step is to look at the state of  affairs, and determine
what, if  anything, has occurred that is either abnormal or dynamic.
We then scrutinize those events as the probably cause. Of  course,
the short circuit is abnormal and dynamic. A short circuit which
causes a spark is abnormal - we almost never observe the occurrence
of  one of  those - as well as it is dynamic.
There are two obvious reactions to this view. The first is that
20 See Note 12
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the common/abnormal dynamic/static distinction is a pretty poor
one for an analysis of  causation. There are serious earthquakes that
are caused by subterranean pressure that builds slowly over the course
of  thousands of  years - pressure that is always present, and hardly
abnormal, but most certainly the cause. Moreover, this pressure does
not increase dynamically, but rather instead increases ever so slowly,
until one day an earthquake is the effect. Certainly, there were many
more dynamic events which occurred in the vicinity. But which we
would not be willing to call the cause. This objection assumes that
what Hart and Honoré are trying to do is give an analysis of  causation,
which they are not, instead of  explain how common sense deals
with questions of  causation, which they are. Nonetheless, even as a
heuristic, this common sense view leaves much to be desired.
The second, and more pressing, concern is that even given
that this common sense view works, it still leaves much of  the causal
judgment open to intuitions about context. If  we first take all the
conditions, strip away negative events, strip away common
occurrences, and static states of  affairs, we are still left with several
events from which to choose as the cause. And if  that is still the
case, it looks like the legal realists are correct. If  Hart and Honoré
leave us with several candidates from which to choose, it may appear
that when one does decide, it will be to forward a certain policy
agenda, or to advance some range of  public or social ends.
Hart and Honoré fully embrace this second concern. They
recognize that causal judgments are, in a sense, relative to the
perspective and interest of  the individual making the judgment. Still,
they argue, this does not reduce to a simple cover for blatant
enforcement of  policy on the part of  the judge or jury. Refer again
to our discussion above in which the question was asked, "what causes
influenza?" The likely perspective of  the individual posing the
question might be of  the man's physician. She might consider the
presence of  flu viruses to be a normal course of  events, and his low
immunity a feature that explains his contracting the illness at this
time. Or she might be the man's wife, who considers the normal
course of  events to be his low immune system, and wonders how he
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became exposed to the virus so as to cause the illness at this time.
The doctor is asking, "why does he contract the illness (given the
exposure to the virus) when most people do not?" The wife is
wondering, "why does he contract the illness now (given his low
immunity) when usually he does not?" The contextual perspectivism
here invites the conclusion that the only factual conclusions here are
the ones derivable by the 'but for' analysis discussed above. Any other
conclusion is a matter of  policy. But, say Hart and Honoré, this is an
oversimplification of  the situation for at least two reasons. I also
give a third reason.
Primarily, the interests of  the two investigators above likely
shape their perspectives and therefore the specific questions that
they ultimately ask. The physician is looking for general causal
principles as an explanation for the illness, while the wife is looking
for specific events that might have led to this instance of  suffering.
But regardless of  the framing of  the questions, or the interests of
those who ask them, the answers will not be based on policy, they'll
be based on fact. The perspective of  those who ask the question
cannot frame the answer that they receive.
Secondly, even when the judgments that are finally made do
represent a context dependent causal judgment, that judgment is
based on common sense principles, outlined above, rather than
surreptitiously acting as a cover for policy issues about social goods.
Common sense acts as a buffer to ensure objectivity.
And finally, and in support of  the first two reasons, I'd argue
that the concept of  the 'causal field' is doing the work here. In fact,
the truth is a compromise between the context dependence of  the
causal realists, who state that every INUS condition has an equal
claim on being the cause, and Hart and Honoré who argue that there
need not be policy guiding causal judgments at all. Remember that
long conjunct of minimally sufficient condition is the actual cause
of  the event in question, but it is the context that asks the question
to determine the relevance of  each INUS condition. The context is
what makes the answer relevant and what gives the judge or jury the
ability legitimately to pick one cause over another.
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To say that one condition over any other is necessarily the
cause is misleading, and an oversimplification. It's true that each has
a equal likelihood of  finally being chosen by judge or jury. But one is
chosen, and how that is done requires an explanation. But as Hart
and Honoré suggest the context of  the question, not the policy or
the social aims of  the judge determine what the answer will be. Just
as it would be irrelevant to get an answer that would be out of  context,
a well determined context, and that is one that can be argued for by
both sides, will rein as the one true condition.
IX. CONCLUSION
By way of  conclusion, the reader should walk away convinced
and enlightened on a number of  topics. First, that distributive and
corrective justice help elucidate a distinction between a more elusive
fracture between public and private law. Public law finds itself
overwhelmingly concerned with distributing goods across society,
while corrective justice only attempts equalize some harm, while
lacking the normative context inherent in the former. To lack that
normative context is not so simple, as we saw, in determining just
what 'causation' means in a legal context. Normativity sneaks in a
legal account of  causation. And in order to prevent such a thing, it
was important to pull apart the concepts of  liability from causation,
responsibility, and fault. But that is often not as helpful as hoped,
since neither condition proves itself  to be necessary or sufficient in
tort law.
Causation, being the more important, and possibly most illusive,
metaphysical entity in tort law is relied upon very heavily. To elucidate
that point, it was useful to outline the debate between the causal
realists, and the great objectors to this position, i.e., Hart and Honoré.
The problem at first seemed to be whether context dependence entails
hidden policy enforcement, but a look at the causal literature helped
to see that the distinction between the two camps could be brought
a little closer together.
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